The Devil's Delusion by David Berlinski

David Berlinski takes on atheism “and its scientific pretensions” in his book, The Devil’s Delusion. I loved it! The book is a wonder of poetry and prose. No summary by me could ever give it its full due. His logic is unassailable and simple, yet deep and revealing. His use of humor and sarcasm provide a light-hearted, indeed joyful, touch in a book full of somewhat unfamiliar scientific and philosophical concepts. 

Not that he is opposed to science. David Berlinski is an accomplished scientist in his own right. It’s simply that although science can tell us a great deal about the “hows” of the universe, it cannot tell us the “whys.” He states, “While science has nothing of value to say on the great an aching questions of life, death, love, and meaning, what the religious traditions of mankind have said forms a coherent body of thought.” Only religious explanations can satisfy these most deepest of questions. And only recently have militant atheists declared science capable of answering man’s deepest yearnings. 

This book is an answer to that assertion.

Unfortunately, what the atheists both hope for and fear, is that if God does not exist we have only to answer to science, then everything is permitted. But when everything is permitted, we see the horrors of the 20th Century. After all, neither Stalin or Mao or Hitler or any other secular monster was concerned at all that God was watching. “That is, after all, the meaning of secular society.” Without God, everything is permitted.

Of course militant atheists don’t want to go here. Berlinski says, “But if scientific atheists are disposed to challenge God’s existence -- the party line after all -- they are far less willing to reflect on what His dismissal entails.” No God, no moral absolutes, And a world of no moral absolutes is the world the atheists have given us. 

Unfortunately in denying any theological reasoning, science has pushed itself into a corner of internal contradictions. It cannot even say definitively what science is. It can only say what it is not. Theology and belief are said to be definitely not within the realm of science. Yet, scientist operate on faith all the time. They take the fact that the universe is rational and its laws can be discovered and are eternal on faith. Science excludes direct creation a priori, on faith alone. They try to prove or disprove the supernatural, using the laws of the natural. Science has become philosophical all the while disdaining philosophy as unscientific. By decrying religion as illegitimate, science has left us nowhere else to go with philosophical questions. But science is not supposed to be philosophy.

The most basic question tries to answer concerns the origins of the universe. This is where they most veer into philosophy.

Thomas Aquinas posited that the universe began and as such had a first cause and that it surmised must be God. Scientists have tried to refute this with an illogical infinite regression. Yet it soon became apparent that, as the theologians had argued for thousands of years, the universe did in fact have a beginning. It’s called the Big Bang. In a humbling moment, Nobel laureate Arno Penzais remarked, “The best data we have concerning the big bang are exactly what I would have predicted, had I nothing to go on but the five books of Moses, the Psalms, the Bible as a whole.”

But if the universe is not eternal and therefore did not have to exist, we must ask, then why does it exist? Both the how and the why point to God, but science tries desperately to avoid these obvious conclusions.

The deeper we dive, the harder time the scientists have. Discoveries in quantum mechanics have shaken what we thought we knew to the core. Fundamental physical theories must be questioned and if that is the case, what is actually fundamental? Science finds itself trying answer the impossible question of how did we get something from absolutely nothing? The answer to this question simply does not exist in the natural realm. So atheist scientists, desperate to prove a god was not necessary have resorted to equally unprovable and equally unscientific assertions. The Multiverse.

Scientific pretensions to an unbiased following of the facts have now descended into nothing more than faith-based metaphysics. 

Science is finding itself in the maddening position of having to argue that a universe that appears to be finely-tuned to permit the appearance of living beings is in fact a mirage. A designed-looking universe is not designed at all, but certainly mimics one perfectly. A simple bumpkin could be forgiven for assuming design because of the appearance of design, but our vaunted scientists are not country bumpkins. So they play at incomprehensible theories like multiverses and string theory, constantly searching for their own holy grail. They have faith that one day, a theory will emerge stating that nothing controls the universe rather than God.

And they mock us as believers in the unseen. How awkward for them.

Pretentious atheists, such as Richard Dawkins, reject the simple hypothesis of a creator God as improbable and therefore impossible. But they will accept “infinitely many universes crammed into creation, with laws of nature wriggling indiscreetly and fundamental physical parameters changing as one travels from one corner of the cosmos to the next, the whole entire gargantuan structure scientifically unobservable and devoid of any connections to experience.” So God is improbable and the multiverse is simple and elegant?

Moving from the origins of the universe to the origin of man, Berlinski identifies some fundamental flaws in the theory of evolution. No one knows how or why certain characteristics that make us quintessentially human arose. They cannot be latent in the gene pool. That suggests Someone put them there for future usage. In addition, latent genes give natural selection nothing to work with. Latent genes do not evolve. How could they?

In short, science cannot explain the mind. “If we are unable to explain how the human mind works neither in terms of a series of physical causes nor in terms of a series of infinitely receding mechanical devices, what then is left? There is the ordinary, very rich, infinitely moving account of mental life that without hesitation we apply to ourselves. It is an account frankly magical in its nature.”

Physicist Erich Harth remarked, “It is not just that we don’t know the mechanisms that give rise to [the mind]. We have difficulty in seeing how any mechanism can give rise to it.”

So scientists sputter and prognosticate about their vaunted ability to someday find all the answers to finally kill the “God of the Gaps.” But the more gaps they fill, the more holes they open. They are frustrated that simple, no-nothings appear to get to the answers before the geniuses. “Within the English-speaking world, Darwin’s theory of evolution remains the only scientific theory to be widely championed by the scientific community and widely disbelieved by everyone else.” How maddening.

Berlinski states categorically, “Suspicions about Darwin’s theory arise for two reasons. The first: the theory makes little sense. The second: it is supported by little evidence.” Yet it serves as their creation myth demanding an “especially ardent form of advocacy.”

To their horror, even scientists within the faith are starting to question. Eugene Koonin detailed the facts that don’t line up with Darwinianism. These include, “the origin of complex RNA molecules and protein folds; major groups of viruses; archaea and bacteria, and the principal lineages within each of these prokaryotic domains; eukaryotic supergroups; and animal phyla.” What’s left?

Scientists have climbed the mount of knowledge and discovered the theologians sitting at the top. 

I love this book!

Crisis of the House Divided by Henry Jaffa

I’m a huge fan of Dr. Larry Arne of Hillsdale College. So when he recommended a book on the Lincoln-Douglas Debates, by his mentor, Dr. Harry Jaffa, I had to get it. Crisis of the House Divided was originally published in 1959 and it shows. I think Americans were a lot smarter then. I think they were tremendously smarter than we are today when the original Lincoln/Douglass Debates took place. The book took me weeks to read and it’s only about 400 pages long, but it was a long, tough slog. I’m just not knowledgeable enough about the time of the debates, the issues involved, or the thinking at the time the book was written. Nevertheless, I’m glad I plowed through. It certainly opened my eyes to a part of history I thought I knew pretty well. 

Dr. Jaffa writes, “It is doubtful that any forensic duel, any clash of reasoned argument before a popular audience -- or, for that matter, before any legislative body -- ever held the power of decision over the future of a great people as these debates did.” By opposing Douglas, Lincoln set in motion a chain of events that eventually led to secession, the Civil War and Emancipation.

Douglas believed in “Popular Sovereignty” when it came to slavery in the states. He was pushing for legislation, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, that would allow states to vote slavery up or or down as they went from territory to state and effectively abolish the Missouri Compromise line of 1820 (although he claimed he did not was to see the Compromise repealed). This idea tapped into the long-standing American tradition of local self-government. Lincoln, seeing this as absurd, believed free government could not be reconciled to slavery, and that no man was so good at self-governing as to be able to govern over another. The existence of slaver was so repugnant to a free society, it simply could not be put to a vote. By challenging Douglas’ idea of popular sovereignty, Lincoln opened up a debate that would threaten the very existence of America.

Dr. Jaffa begins by presenting Douglas’ case. Stephen Douglas saw himself as the descendent of Andrew Jackson. He desired to spread democracy as far as it would go. He loved the Constitution and would go to remarkable lengths to defend it. His fame and integrity were such that even though he was a Democrat, had not Lincoln challenged him, the Republicans were considering Douglas as their standard-bearer. 

Being a strict Constitutionalist, Douglas, and most everyone else, believed the Constitution did not give the Federal government a say over the legality of slavery. Not only was it unConstitutional to do so, but he rightly feared it would tear the country apart. As a friend to both North and South, he was uniquely positioned to see the passions and positions on both sides. Unlike the abolitionists, who appealed to a “higher law” and were willing to go around the Constitution, Douglas knew his bill would pass Constitutional muster and be approved by the South, even if it hurt them in the end. 

Douglas did not necessarily want slavery to spread, in fact in his lifetime he had seen state after state abolish it within their jurisdiction. He recognized that the line of Missouri Compromise had become a protection of slavery rather than a limitation of it. He firmly believed that in giving states north of the line the power to vote, that would allow states south of the line to enter as free states as well. The current line presupposed all southern states would enter as slave states. Popular Sovereignty made no such preconditions. 

Douglas believed the battle must be fought for hearts and minds. Both Lincoln and Douglas recognized that without public sentiment behind you, laws were meaningless. While proclaiming he didn’t care a whit about whether the vote went for or against slavery, it is clear, he believed time and again the vote would be against. As more states entered the Union “free,” the slave states would see their power diminish and eventually the institution would wither. But as Popular Sovereignty came to embody “free soil” as a goal, Douglas had to work harder to maintain neutrality so as not to lose the South. 

Douglas believed strongly in the theory of Manifest Destiny and actually supported the American takeover of all of North and South America from the European imperialists so that more territories could be admitted and more opportunities for free states to be potentially created. Of course this would have created a very different kind of America than the one Lincoln wished to merely preserve.To that end, he beat the anti-European (and by extension, anti-abolition) drum that pervaded America at this time. As a true statesman, Douglas worked very to find the delicate balance of the possible, the moods of the people, and the good of his country. Not an easy job.

“When Lincoln in 1858 expressed the conviction that the Union must become all slave or all free, Douglas accused him of advocating a war between the sections. And Lincoln’s persistent retort was that he did not, by theses words, advocate anything at all; he only said what he believed would happen.” This conviction had been percolating in Lincoln’s psyche for many years. In fact, Lincoln seems to have presaged his role when he speaks of a Great Emancipator in his Lyceum Speech of 1838. In fact, those who knew Lincoln best said his “common man” exterior was affected and designed to give the appearance of one who was common but in fact covered up a very deep thinker.

Lincoln saw the country was actually moving in the wrong direction when it came to black civil rights. This was highlighted by the Dredd Scott decision holding that no black person could be a citizen, ever. However, this did not make Lincoln a friend to abolitionists. He saw in them a kind of mob rule and an appeal to lawlessness. He recognized the core of every argument being made came down to whether or not slavery was right or wrong. If right, then it didn’t matter whether it was extended or not. If wrong, then it couldn’t be extended. Since he believed enslaving a black man meant that a white man could be enslaved on the same grounds, he repeatedly made the case that slavery was wrong. But his desire to argue and change minds rather than resort to unConstitutional mob rule angered the abolitionists of his day. And his position certainly didn’t gain him friends in the pro-slavery crowd. 

Lincoln clearly saw the danger of the Popular Sovereignty movement. He believed it was “a base parody of of the principle of popular rights. It implied that whatever the people wanted they had a right to...” And some things, like slavery, were simply not issues that could be put to a vote in a republican form of government. For slavery violated the very spirit and foundation of republican government in the first place. Lincoln saw himself as an Old Testament prophet trying to get the people to follow him to a higher place. He wanted to lead the country into a new era where the words of Declaration of Independence, “all men are created equal,” would become a sacred reality. “For Lincoln, there was nothing more substantially important than whether Americans lived their lives believing that all men are created equal or whether they did not. For Lincoln the material prosperity of America saw chiefly valuable as the external sign of inner spiritual health. And that health -- the qualitative superiority of American life -- was inextricably and inexorably linked to the tenets of the Declaration of Independence.” The true statesman helps create this conviction in the hearts and minds of the people. Lincoln warned the people that if the Declaration was right, then nothing justified the enslavement of the Negro. But if the Negro was a man, then the Declaration was wrong and didn’t include blacks. The pro-slavery crowd could admit neither proposition. Everyone knew that the Founders clearly intended “all men” to mean “all men.” They relied on the future to enforce and secure that right. According to Lincoln, it was time to start enforcing the Declaration.

Dr. Jaffa offers this wonderful summary, “Douglas’s policy with respect to slavery... constituted a kind of agreement to disagree. The desirability of such an agreement was predicated, in turn, upon his belief that ‘we exist as a nation only by virtue of the Constitution’ and that therefore a scrupulous observance of all constitutional duties was all that was really necessary for the states and sections to live amicably together. Citizens of the several states might continue to hold differing opinions on slavery because they would abstain from any attempt to frame a joint policy on slavery, an attempt which would inevitably produce collision. Lincoln, however, categorically denied the whole foundation of this policy because Lincoln denied that we existed as a nation solely, or even mainly, by virtue of the Constitution. This denial he was to make the affirmative faith of the nation at Gettysburg, when ‘fourscore and seven years ago’ carefully placed the birth of the nation in the year 1776, not the year 1787.And the life principle of the nation was then said to be not the compromises of the Constitution -- which Lincoln, as an honest man, always admitted and freely accepted -- but in the dedication and rededication to the equality of all men.”

Today, Lincoln is criticized for not being a purist. He did not call for the end of all slavery.  He did not argue for the rights of black people to vote. He never advocated full interracial equality. Lincoln was a true statesman. He operated in the realm of the possible, know it was his job to nudge the people closer to the perfect position. Had been a purist, his party would have lost and slavery, not freedom, would have been in ascendency. Wisely, Lincoln eschewed aiming for heaven to avoid hell on earth. There is a lesson in there somewhere for purists today. If you are right, make your case incrementally and the people will follow. 

This book was a hard slog for me. The reasoning of both the authors and the subjects was so intricate and nuanced, many times I had trouble following it! I cannot imagine a world in which the debates of Lincoln and Douglas resonated so powerfully with the common people. Our culture today is the lesser for it. 

The Savior Generals by Victor Davis Hanson - Petraeus

The final general chronicled in Victor Davis Hanson’s The Savior Generals is David Petraeus. Calling his story, “Iraq is Lost,” Hanson starts the story from a rather grim place.

The battle in Iraq had begun with stunning success. Donald Rumsfield strategy of a “light footprint” had led to a lightning fast incursion into the country following the tragedy of 9/11. In less than 3 weeks, Saddam Hussein’s government was removed and the task of establishing an America-friendly regime seemed easily surmountable. 

Yet almost immediately the complexity of the situation sank in and the initial flush of an easy victory faded. No stockpiles of WMD were found. The country became chaotic. No one seemed to be in charge. Conventional weapons were not guarded and were looted, providing the enemy with artillery. The administration began to publicly feud over how to lead a headless Iraq to a peaceful resolution. 

At home, the vaunted “light footprint” became a subject of much debate. Did we send in too few troops? Too many? Should we have even gone in the first place? Was the whole thing a mistake based on a lie/misinformation?

The first thing the military administration did was to cleanse the government of those loyal to Saddam, the baathists. This seemed reasonable, yet instantly the country was deprived of most of its bureaucratic apparatus and most competent workers. Left high and dry, it was an easy decision for them to joint the insurgent. Meanwhile, the majority Shiite population saw Saddam’s demise as an opportunity to rise out of the oppression they felt under the previously Sunni government and become the oppressors. 

As the counterinsurgency became more deadly to American forces, the American people began to turn against what seemed to be an increasingly hopeless endeavor based on naively optimistic projections. President Bush’s claim that freedom was a universal value and the Iraqi’s would welcome us a liberators looked more and more like wishful thinking. 

The military argued for an even smaller force to counter anti-Americanism, or more nation-building, or more targeting of known terrorists and their hubs. But a maverick named David Petraeus argued we actually needed a completely different strategy. Although everyone agreed the status quo was not working, very few believed Petraeus’ idea to temporarily “surge” the number of forces in Iraq. Petraeus envisioned a counterinsurgency to the counterinsurgency. He would work to make areas of Iraq calmer and more secure by inserting enough forces to protect the civilians and deprive the insurgents the necessary support and sanctuary they needed from the population.

After a particularly harsh election rebuke in 2006, Bush was willing to listen to small group, led by the charismatic Petraeus, and their surge strategy. They advocated three elements. The first was to increase the troops by 20-30,0000. The second was to promote Petraeus to the position of supreme commander in Iraq. And the third was to complete replace the methods of fighting as well as the people overseeing the fighting and reconstruction in Iraq. Bush grabbed the lifeline being offered, hoping a war-weary public would support a large-scale change of tactics while never using the Vietnam-era tainted word, “escalation.”

Once the plan was accepted, commanders in Iraq began implementing the changes even prior to the arrival of the new troops. Instead of safely hunkering in the green zones, troops were sent out into smaller outposts inside Baghdad’s neighborhoods, creating a much more conspicuous presence. Rather than drum up more anti-American sentiment, the troops were seen as reassuring to the population. However the downside of the exposure of troops led, temporarily to more American deaths. Initial fears of Vietnam style body bags overwhelming the news Americans received quickly vanished as the death count soon plummeted with the arrival of the new troops. 

Like all the other Savior Generals, Petraeus had spent a lifetime preparing for just this sort of role. All his life experiences had served to make him and expert in “large-scale postbellum occupation and reconstruction in highly urbanized, extremely hostile populations -- exactly what Iraq would be like in 2003.” He was the perfect man for the job. His success in Iraq led to changing opinions of the war at home and silenced critics in the Congress who wanted to cut and run. The quote that started this section, “Iraq is lost.” came from the mouth of Harry Reid. Petraeus made that kind of rhetoric cease. 

He curbed the American casualties suffered because of crude roadside explosive devices by embedding more troops within the population to gain better intelligence concerning the bombing crews. He requisitioned better, though less maneuverable, tanks that could protect against the bombs. The plummeting death toll had the intended effect of boosting morale with the troops and people at home. 

Like most of the other Savior Generals, Petraeus life after his astounding victory was rocky. He went onto assume the command of CENTCOM, “the most prestigious and important regional theater of operations.” He led the counterterrorism operation in 20 countries as well as overseeing Iraq and Afghanistan. 

But once General Stanley McChrystal was abruptly relieved of his post as commander in Afghanistan for indiscreet comments, Petraeus was asked to actually take a step down and head up the efforts in that flailing contest. Afghanistan did not prove as successful for Petraeus, and after a year, he stepped down to head the CIA. Later a scandal in his marriage led him to resign that post as well. 

America, with Obama at the helm, seems intent on reversing the gains in Iraq made by Petraeus. Unfortunately we fail to realize how much Petraeus did for America and the perception of it around the world. He restored our military reputation and made sure the world knew we could and would win when we set our mind to it. But we seem to have forgotten that lesson and are throwing away the accomplishment of a great leader. 

Maybe it’s time for Savior General here at home. 

The Savior Generals by Victor Davis Hanson - Ridgway

The 4th story in Victor Davis Hanson’s book, The Savior Generals, bears the title “One Hundred Days in Korea” and relates the tale of General Matthew Ridgway. I know almost nothing about the Korean War, so this particular story was all new to me. 

Shortly after WW2, Harry Truman had made Korea a test of American resolve to never again appease and aggressor. But by December, 1950, that determination was looking to fail. 

The very popular General MacArthur was in charge of the Pacific, yet he had failed to anticipate the large Communist Chinese incursion into the peninsula. However, in the days when we had just stopped the Japanese with an atomic bomb, MacArthur believed the best way to deal with the hordes was to once again resort to nuclear weapons to bomb the Chinese supply lines. Truman did not rule it out. 

If Korea fell, it appeared the aggression of the communists would overtake Japan, Taiwan, or maybe even the Philippines. It looked desperate.

General Ridgway had made a name for himself calling for America to fight limited, conventional wars and eschew nuclear weapons as the first choice. “Perhaps his appointment to save a limited war through conventional means was seen as a way of putting Ridgway’s proverbial money where his mouth was.” Ridgway was one of the few generals who had actually seen combat but he knew little about Asia and Korea in particular. 

Initially, MacArthur had enjoyed stunning success. He pushed the North Koreans all the way back to the the border with China. But MacArthur was one to brag that he had reunited the peninsula and so antagonized the Chinese neighbors. The communists had finally crossed the border and pushed the Americans almost out of the country. 

“Against this backdrop of the growing panic, Ridgway was taking over a seemingly hopeless command pawned off on him by his legendary superior, General MacArthur. The latter was ensconced  hundreds of miles away in Tokyo fighting political battles with the Truman administration for his own legacy and reputation, hoping to preserve a possible future career in politics. If the Americans surrendered or were destroyed, Ridgway would be responsible for that defeat as supreme commander in the field -- and MacArthur could use Ridgway’s failure as proof that the war effort had been shorted by Washington. Yet if Ridgway were to be successful in restoring the front, the credit would likely go to the old strategist MacArthur, who still enjoyed nominal overall command.” Ridgway was faced with a lose-lose proposition. 

The Communists were similarly dug-in about not allowing an American backed government right on their doorstep. Russia and Mao believed all of Korea belonged in their sphere. Ridgway was not even clear on the American objective. Were we willing to go the distance and take the whole country? Could we defeat a newly nuclear-armed Russia? Were our nuclear weapons even capable of being effective against China?

Ridgway knew he had to raise the morale of the troops he commanded. They had just suffered a disastrous route after a huge victory. Just his appearance encouraged his men. He routinely dressed as a common soldier. He had a grenade and medical kit strapped onto his shoulders as if at any time he could be called into battle. Also, he knew his history and the age-old problems of armies making huge incurrences into enemy territory. The further they went, the longer and less stable became the supply lines. Like Johnston, Ridgway sought a tactical retreat, hoping to stretch the Chinese supply lines, while strengthening his troops until the communists were vulnerable to a counterattack. 

Because of his genius strategy, “in about eleven weeks after Ridgway’s arrival, Seoul was recaptured from the Chinese and North Koreans. In little more than three months, South Korea was in fact saved and its borders restored to or beyond the 38th Parallel.” Ridgway’s good news was actually disheartening to MacArthur because he proved the old general wrong. We did not need atomic bombs and more funding from Washington to preserve South Korea. 

Ridgway did not press on to take the whole country. The country had been divided for many years. The battle to reunite the halves led to talk of nuclear weapons and invasions of China. After Ridgway’s victory in reclaiming Seoul and the 38th Parallel, “all such desperate planning quietly ceased.” 

We forget that once we entered “the nuclear age,” limited conventional wars were thought to be a thing of the past. Ridgway’s brilliant conventional victory removed the instant reliance on our nuclear arsenal. We may be able to credit the fact that no one has ever again dared to detonate an atomic weapon to Ridgway’s success in South Korea, a place once believed to be lost. 

Americans proved that Soviet aggression could be stopped, and we succeeded in giving South Korea “a chance to find their own destiny.” The success of both South Korea and Taiwan today owe much to Matthew Ridgway.

The Savior Generals by Victor Davis Hanson - Sherman

I’m loving learning about the Civil War. So I was excited to see that Victor Davis Hansen included General Sherman as the 3rd story in his book The Savior Generals. He entitled the piece, “Atlanta is Ours and Fairly Won.” Compared to his contemporaries, Sherman seems an unlikely man to become one of the very few to be given the title “Savior General.” Yet his apparent background of “failure” provided exactly what he needed to go on to secure Atlanta for the Union.

Hansen writes, “Quite unknowingly, by taking on and losing job after job, he had been engaged in a three-decade-long course of practical and formal preparation for generalship in a new age of mobile and total warfare. At one time or another, Sherman had refined his formal education at West Point with jobs as diverse as college administrator, banker, businessman, farmer, lawyer, and trader. He had visited and been deployed throughout much of the United States even as he was written off as a hopeless failure. At one point, Sherman confessed, ‘I was afraid of my own shadow.’”

After victories at Shiloh and Vicksburg, Grant was moved to head the entire Union army in the east. Sherman was left to the western front. But Grant was bogged down on his way to Richmond after a devastating defeat at Cold Harbor. 

Politically, Lincoln was in trouble. The election was coming up and the nation was war weary. The country appeared ready to replace Lincoln with the incompetent general McClellan, whom Lincoln had fired. McClellan promised to end the war which would effectively leave the union split into two nations. Lincoln needed a major victory soon if he was to have any chance at reelection. 

Paradoxically, the farther into the South the Federals pushed, the harder victory became. They encountered the age-old problem in war. More land had to be occupied with fewer troops who more stretched and removed from their home territory and stable supply lines. Lee figured out that the battle had become political more than military. The longer he could hold out, the closer to the election it got, and the surer Lincoln’s defeat become. Lee just had to run out the clock, not defeat the North. 

Meanwhile, Grant was bogged down in the horrendous “Wilderness Campaign” on his way to Richmond. The mind-numbing number of casualties he was suffering continued to contribute to the nation’s sense of defeat. It became apparent that there was no way Grant would make it to Richmond in time to secure a victory before the election.

While Grant fought in the wilderness, Sherman set out from Tennessee with Atlanta in his sights. With the win at Vicksburg, the Union controlled the Mississippi. If Grant could march to Atlanta, the South would be cut in half again and the war effectively won. But the calendar read May 7. He had only a few short months to end a war which had been going on three years at this point.

Sherman instituted a three-pronged approach towards Georgia. As Sherman neared, Confederate general Johnston felt his position to be untenable and despite six months spent building fortifications, he retreated without a fight. 

The Federals continued to push Johnston who continued to retreat. Johnston was trying to do to Sherman what Lee was doing to Grant. Johnston sought to slowly draw Sherman towards a big decisive battle or costly stalemate, while keeping an eye on the calendar. However, the geography worked in Sherman’s favor. “There was simply not enough land between Sherman and Atlanta to ensure, at the present rate of advance, that he would not get there before the critical November election.” Sherman kept pressing and pushing Johnston inexorably closer and closer to Atlanta. Johnston hope the lengthening supply lines and wild terrain along with occasional skirmishes would run out the clock.

Despite his success at living off the land and continuing to push Johnston, in June, Sherman deviated from his plan. He decided to attack the now dug in Confederates at Kennesaw Mountain. Rather than being the decisive victory Lincoln needed, the Union forces suffered a punishing defeat. Unlike Grant, Sherman learned his lesson. He would not continue that suicidal head-on tactic, knowing that with his larger and more motivated army, he could keep pushing Johnston. 

As Johnston continued to retreat and the Union advanced further into the South, southern morale began to plummet. Jefferson Davis had had enough of the retreating Johnston and in a fatal decision replaced the cool, even-tempered general with the young, fiery and impetuous Hood. No more simply chasing the confederates. Hood stood his ground and fought. But he could not win against Sherman who continued to push the rebels towards Atlanta at devastating costs to the South. 

Sherman besieged Atlanta, destroying the life-blood railroad tracks that brought supplies into the city. On September, Hood pulled his forces from the city, blowing up the city’s munitions as Sherman entered. “In less than fifteen weeks since leaving Tennessee, Sherman with relatively light casualties had taken the second most important city of the Confederacy. His army remained over eighty thousand soldiers strong -- not that much smaller than when he had begun the Atlanta campaign.”

While Sherman was faulted for letting Hood and his army escape, he accomplished some pretty amazing things. First, he provided a huge morale boost to the North and destroyed McClellan’s presidential bid. Second, he ensured very light casualties. Third, the continued attacks on Hood’s forces at Atlanta had reduced the rebel numbers by half. Fourth, Hood was unable to reinforce Lee. Fifth, the North was positions deep inside the South. Sixth, Sherman gave deference to Grant and so saved the man’s sinking reputation. 

After the victory over Atlanta, Sherman continued to march to the sea, eventually making into Virginia and with Grant, forcing an official end to the war in April 1865. Sherman’s widely remarked upon pillaging and burning the South as he marched east had the desired effect of uncontrovertibly defeating and humiliating the South. He wanted them to see once and for all the ramifications of their decision to inflict war on the United States. 

Without the courage and decisiveness of Uncle Billy and his men, Lincoln might very well have lost the election and the United State today would look very different.

The Savior Generals by Victor Davis Hanson - Belisarius

Story number 2 in Victor Davis Hanson’s excellent book, The Savior Generals is entitled, “Byzantium at the Brink.” He tells the epic and tragic story of Flavius Belisarius who served the Byzantine Empire from A.D. 527-59.

The medieval myth has our hero Belisarius ending his life a poor beggar, blind and crying for coins in the street. The truth is not so harrowing, but tragic nonetheless. 

Belisarius enters the picture at age 25 into a civilization in crisis. By this point in time, the Byzantine Empire has lost much of its Roman origins. It relied on barbarians, bribes, and strategic marriages to maintain its vast borders. The future emperor, Justinian, and his lieutenant, the young Belisarius, believed Byzantine must be saved at all costs. Justinian dreamed of reuniting the old Roman Empire under his eventual rule. Belisarius would be his instrument. Both recognized the greatness that had been lost when the old empire fell, and both believed, against all odds it could be restored. 

While he may have been motivated by the treasure and power to be gained, it appears that “ultimately what drove [Belisarius] and thousands in the high echelons of Byzantine government and the military for more than thirty years against near impossible odds were both his faith in Christianity and his allegiance to the idea of Roman civilization and the gifts it had bestowed on millions.” A restored Rome would be Belisarius’ gift to the world.

Belisarius was first sent out against the trouble-making Persians in the east. Usually, Constantinople determined that it made more sense to simply pay off the Persians to stay away. But in 527, the emperor Justin decided he’d had enough and decided resistance would be cheaper. Although young, Belisarius’ connection to the Emperor’s nephew and future emperor, Justinian, secured his place as the commanding officer. “Belisarius almost immediately proved worthy of his selection through two characteristics that would elevate his leadership above his contemporaries. First, he was calm in battle, and he knew instinctively the relationship between tactics and strategy and thus avoided wasting the limited resources of the empire in needless head-on confrontations that would lead to no long-term advantage. Second, Belisarius was skilled in counterinsurgency, in winning the hearts and minds of local populations by not plundering or destroying villages and infrastructure... Such restraint was rare among gold-hungry Byzantine commanders in the east. The result was that, even after initial defeats, Belisarius never lost an army or had hostile populations turn on his rear.”

These aforementioned traits served time and again throughout his lifetime of service.

After holding the Persians to a stand still and securing the borders, Belisarius was ordered home to Constantinople to prepare to fight the Vandal Kingdom off to the coast of North Africa. Upon his arrival, he found mobs attacking the weak new emperor, Justinian, demanding reforms. Belisarius set out to arrest the ringleader, but on his own initiative, set upon the rioters and led the emperor’s troops in the slaughter of up to 30,000. This, along with the advice of Justinian’s wife, Theodora, to stand and not flee, led to a strengthened and, increasingly ruthless, Justinian. 

After setting the kingdom aright, Belisarius flew off to North Africa. For close to a century, the Vandal kingdom had had an uneasy peace with the Byzantine Empire. But after a pro-Byzantine king was dethroned in a coup and his cousin, the usurper, began persecuting Christians, Justinian knew this was his chance to reclaim old Roman land. 

Drawing upon his skills of using limited resources wisely and fostering counterinsurgency, Belisarius made it to the capital city, Carthage, in six days. Over the next three months, he worked to win over the local population and those still loyal to the previous regime. He knew his limited forces could never hold the city if he did not have the backing of the inhabitants. “Less than seven months later, his army had destroyed the century-old Vandal kingdom in Africa, captured the usurper king... either killed, enslaved, or recruited into his army most of the Vandal population,established a new Byzantine province... and sent waves of terror through the Gothic hierarchy in Italy that it might be next in line...”

The Goths in Italy had terrorized Roman society for two hundred years. Constantinople was too far from Italy to succumb to the harassment, but also too far to re-occupy it. After returning to Constantinople with the plunder of the Vandals, Belisarius headed west again and on December 9, 536, he entered Rome having “annexed much of North Africa and retaken Sicily and half of Italy.” Belisarius probably paid for his small forces out his own share of the booty from the Vandal campaign, not wanting to stress the official treasury. 

His rapid success was not without cost, however. In typical emperor fashion, Justinian began to see the successful, maturing general Belisarius as a potential rival for his power. Belisarius was recalled to Constantinople despite the effect it had on the successful retaking of the rest of Italy. Unlike his return from the Vandal conquest, he was given no triumphal marches. Yet the people’s love for him grew. They recognized his virtues and success which led the emperor to fear him even more. Fortunately, the Persians were again threatening in the east and so Belisarius was dispatched. 

Belisarius fought the Persians to a standstill for two years while the capital city was ravaged by a plague. This further limited his resources, and personal problems with his enterprising and cunning wife, Antonia, took their toll. Once again, his outreach to the local population proved the best plan of action as he was able to “push back the enemy at little cost while neither exceeding nor failing to meet his emperor’s goals.” All this time, despite Justinian’s fears, Belisarius shows no desire to usurp power from his friend.

Because of the plague, Justinian fell desperately ill. Intrepid generals used this as an excuse to plot for a replacement. Although Belisarius did not indicate he wanted the role, the fact that his name was mentioned and championed was enough to cause his downfall. While Justinian recovered, his wife, Theodora, took over the inquisition into the plotters. “Belisarius was relieved of command and had his wealth confiscated. He could neither finish the Persian war nor head back west to stabilize the renewed Gothic conflict in Italy, Instead, for more than two years he was persona non grata in Constantinople, ostracized, impoverished, and under constant suspicion.” His only hope lay in a fully recovered Justinian returning him to his commission. Although the emperor recovered, Belisarius is lost to the historical record for a decade.

He suddenly reappears in 559. With all the generals and the severely depleted forces scattered all over the world fighting to maintain the newly reformed Roman Empire, the Huns chose to attack the capital. In desperation, the aging Justinian had no choice but to once again turn to his old friend, Belisarius, to protect the Byzantine Empire. Once again the old fighter did what he did best, snatch victory from the jaws of defeat in the loyal service of his king. “But the contrast between Justinian’s panic and Belisarius’ fortitude only furthered their final estrangement.”

Once again, Belisarius was the subject of a conspiracy investigation. Although finally cleared because it was simply too dangerous to convict such a popular hero, Belisarius died two years later, eight months before the paranoid emperor. 

“At his death, Flavius Belisarius’ imperial Constantinople -- nearly wiped out by successive epidemics of bubonic plague, with Bulgars once again nearing the gates of the city, its Christianity torn apart by schisms and heresies, the great dome of the magnificent church of Hagia Sophia just recently restored from sudden collapse due to design flaws, the forty-year reign of its greatest emperor nearing a close -- would nonetheless endure another 888 years. Its resilience had been in no small part due to the thirty-year nonstop warring of Belisarius -- the last Roman general and the greatest military commander that a millennium-long Byzantium would produce -- who in a brief three decades had expanded the size of the eastern empire by 45 percent. Belisarius did not save a theater, or even a war, but rather an entire empire through unending conflict his entire life.”

The Savior Generals by Victor Davis Hanson - Themistocles

Throughout all of human history a handful of generals have performed so admirably in what looked to all to be a hopeless cause, that Victor Davis Hanson has dubbed them, The Savior Generals. These are not the men one would normally associate with such a grandiose title. In fact VDH states, “Such men emerge far later from the lower echelons when wars are almost lost. They arise only because their superiors are desperate and turn to the unlikely, to whom, in normal circumstance, they otherwise probably would not.” The use of the word “savior” attached to these generals refers to a lasting victory with historical repercussions. These are the victories which mark turning points in history’s landscape.

The first such Savior General VDH details is of the little known Themistocles, yet this man may be responsible for the advent of Western Civilization itself. We are more familiar with the famous Battle of Marathon and the loss of the 300 brave Spartans at Thermopylae, but the Battle of Salamis led by Themistocles is what earns him the title of Savior General.

In 480 B.C. Athens faced an existential threat from Xerxes and his Persian empire. The Persians had battled the Greeks 10 years earlier at the Battle of Marathon, resulting in a rousing defeat of the much larger invading Asian force. Ten years later, the Persian hoard invaded again. The Spartans made a brave stand at Thermopylae, resulting in the death of King Leonidas and his 300 troops, yet they ultimately failed to hold the pass. Now the Athenians were forced to abandon their centuries-old city and flee to the nearby coast of the Peloponnese. 

While his fellow Greek had spent the previous 10 years celebrating their victory over Xerxes at Marathon, Themistocles alone recognized it for what it was, a fluke of sorts. The Persians had simply been launching a dry run, with a diminished force, probing at Greek defenses. Themistocles saw with perfect clarity that the Persians would return and unless the Athenians and their allies built up a navy ready to battle Xerxes, all hope would be lost. Capitalizing on a fortuitous silver strike, Themistocles persuaded the Athenians to invest in the latest sea-going battleships, triremes.

Since Themistocles had convinced the Athenians not to take a stand on land and to abandon their city, Themistocles became a general without a home. Consequently his entreaties to the Spartan general Eurybiades to battle the Persians at sea held little sway. As the Greeks became increasingly despondent over their ability to battle back the invading hoards, Themistocles grew increasingly optimistic. “Few others shared his optimism, perhaps because a Spartan king had just fallen in battle at Thermopylae, partly because unlike Themistocles they still had homes to retreat to for a while longer.”

Yet bravely, Themistocles made his case for a sea battle to end the threat for good. “We Athenians have given up, it is true, our houses and city walls, because we did not choose to become enslaved for the sake of things that have no life or soul. But what we still possess is the greatest city in all Greece -- our two hundred warships that are ready now to defend you -- if you are still willing to be saved by them.” 

Incorporating the lessons he had learned from the Battle of Marathon, Themistocles knew sea power allowed a people to decide when and where to fight. Despite their overwhelming loss at Marathon, the Persian survivors had been able to sail away unscathed, choosing when and where to return. In the days when infantry battles seemed the only way, Themistocles envisioned another route. He begged his compatriots to fight in the nearby Salamis straights off the coast of Athens. 

Ignoring Themistocles, the allied generals reviewed their options: 1. Fight on the Attic plain to the north of Athens in the hopes of repeating a Marathon-like victory. 2. Take a stand in Athens to save the city. 3. Surrender and join the Persians. 4. Abandon Athens, fight on the narrow isthmus of Corinth to repel the invaders from Sparta and use the Spartan navy for retreat. This fourth option seemed most promising and had the added benefit of punishing the Athenians for failing to reinforce King Leonidas at Thermopylae. 

Themistocles would have none of it. If the allies would not agree to fight at Salamis and therefore offer the chance at preserving Athens, Themistocles would take the refugee Athenians to Siris and usher in a rebirth of a relocated Athenians. The Spartans could count on no support from his large navy and forces in the upcoming battle. 

Faced with a squabbling and intransigent group of generals, Themistocles engaged in a ruse. He sent his slave Sicinnus on a mission to Xerxes with a “warning” of a complete Greek withdrawal. If Xerxes bought the lie, Themistocles hope it would convince him to hastily pursue the “retreating” Greeks through the straights of Salamis as well as split up his forces to block any exits available to the Greeks. In addition, Themistocles believed he would force his allies’ hands when they saw the Persian deploying. The plan worked perfectly. Xerxes dispatched a contingent of his much larger navy to cut off escape routes, thereby negating his numerical superiority and Themistocles was able to choose the time and place of battle, knowing the straights provided little room for maneuvering the much larger Persian vessels. 

The ensuing battle raged the whole day. “By nightfall half the Persian fleet was sunk, due both to poor tactics and leadership and to the superior morale and seamanship of the crews of the Greek triremes, who knew far better the tides and currents of Salamis Bay -- and that defeat meant the enslavement of their families watching from the beaches.” The surviving fleet and much of the Persian infantry raced back to Asia, hoping to cross the Hellespont before the Greeks could demolish their pontoon bridge. Some of the retreating Persian land forces and their general, Mardonius, raced to the north for the winter, leaving the Athenians to return to their homes to rebuild after the Persians had burned it. The Asian forces returned the following summer for a land battle in the plains of Attic after burning the city of Athens again. However, because they had lost their navy and much of their infantry after Salamis, Mardonius was killed and his forces crushed. Greece was forever free of the Persian threat thanks to the brilliant foresight of Themistocles.

But what happened to him after his epic victory? Themistocles disappears from the history books after the Battle of Salamis for five years. He then turns up in the territory of his old enemy, the Persians, where he seems to have perished at his own hand. It seems that although he achieved a stunning victory, Themistocles was never accepted or revered by his own people. His arrogance and cunning put off the virtuously-minded Athenians. He had turned their world upside down with his unorthodox methods and thinking. The victory alone was not enough to overcome their distaste for him and his methods. 

So what did he do right, that led to a resounding victory? First, he built an armada from the windfall silver gains. He learned the lesson from Marathon that everyone else overlooked. Sea power was key to Greek survival. Second, he took the daring step of ordering the complete abandonment of Athens. He recognized that a city is its people, not its buildings. He saved a people and a culture. The building could and would be rebuilt, or like he threatened, he could build a new Athens with the refugees. Third, he overcame enormous opposition and forced the battle to occur at Salamis. Subsequent events proved how futile any of the plans of the other generals would have been. A victory in the straights of Salamis, it turns out, was the only way to preserved the Greeks. In fact, “What made Themistocles a great captain was his ability to craft strategy to reflect national character: Sea power not only embodied the city’s real strengths, but would alone make Athens preeminent among the Greek poleis.” In contrast to Xerxes, perched on a throne overlooking the ensuing sea battle, Themistocles was in the lead trireme. Unlike most Greek generals, Themistocles confided in his slave and used him as an integral player. Finally, while Xerxes was revered and feared by his troops, Themistocles was hated and reviled. Not coming from the landed aristocracy, Themistocles was a soldiers’ general. 

But finally, what was the lasting impact of Themistocles’ bold and unconventional actions? Had the Greeks lost that day, Greece would have been a conquered nation and their culture would have stagnated under the Persian rule. The Greek “ideas about personal freedom, democracy, the rights of individuals, and rationalism” would have been lost to us. The philosophies of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle followed many years after Themistocles’ victory and so handed down to us today the very foundations of Western Civilization. In short, “without the savior general Themistocles, the world as we know it today might have been a very different place indeed.”